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development actors need a better understanding of the linkages 
between environmental change, displacement and migration. 
This report, therefore, offers:
empirical evidence•	  from a first-time, multi-continent survey of 
environmental change and migration;
original maps•	  illustrating how, and where, the impacts of 
climate change may prompt significant displacement and 
migration; 
policy recommendations•	  that reflect the collective thinking 
of key multi-lateral and research institutions, as well as non-
governmental organizations working directly with many of 
the world’s most vulnerable populations.
frequency and intensity of natural hazards such as cyclones, 
floods, and droughts, the number of temporarily displaced 
people will rise.  This will be especially true in countries that 
fail to invest now in disaster risk reduction and where the 
official response to disasters is limited.
Seasonal migration already plays an important part in many •	
families’ struggle to deal with environmental change.  This 
is likely to become even more common, as is the practice of 
migrating from place to place in search of ecosystems that 
can still support rural livelihoods.
Glacier melt will affect major agricultural systems in Asia. As •	
the storage capacity of glaciers declines, short-term flood 
risks increase.  This will be followed by decreasing water 
flows in the medium- and long-term. Both consequences of 
glacier melt would threaten food production in some of the 
world’s most densely populated regions.  
Sea level rise will worsen saline intrusions, inundation, storm •	
surges, erosion, and other coastal hazards.  The threat is 
particularly grave vis-à-vis island communities.  There is strong 
evidence that the impacts of climate change will devastate 
subsistence and commercial agriculture on many small 
islands.
In the densely populated Ganges, Mekong, and Nile River •	
deltas, a sea level rise of 1 meter could affect 23.5 million 
people and reduce the land currently under intensive 
agriculture by at least 1.5 million hectares.  A sea level rise of 
2 meters would impact an additional 10.8 million people and 
render at least 969 thousand more hectares of agricultural 
land unproductive. 
Many people won’t be able to flee far enough to adequately •	
avoid the negative impacts of climate change—unless they 
receive support. Migration requires resources (including 
financial, social, and political capital) that the most vulnerable 
populations frequently don’t have. Case studies indicate that 
poorer environmental migrants can find their destinations as 
precarious as the places they left behind. 
 
Executive Summary
The impacts of climate change are already causing migration and 
displacement. Although the exact number of people that will be 
on the move by mid-century is uncertain, the scope and scale 
could vastly exceed anything that has occurred before. People in 
the least developed countries and island states will be affected 
first and worst.  
The consequences for almost all aspects of development and 
human security could be devastating. There may also be 
substantial implications for political stability.
Most people will seek shelter in their own countries while others 
cross borders in search of better odds. Some displacement and 
migration may be prevented through the implementation of 
adaptation measures. However, poorer countries are under-
equipped to support widespread adaptation. As a result, 
societies affected by climate change may find themselves locked 
into a downward spiral of ecological degradation, towards the 
bottom of which social safety nets collapse while tensions and 
violence rise. In this all-too-plausible worst-case scenario, 
large populations would be forced to migrate as a matter of 
immediate survival.    
Climate-related migration and displacement can be successfully 
addressed only if they are seen as global processes rather 
than local crises. The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities—both in terms of minimizing displacement 
and supporting unavoidable migration—must, therefore, 
underlie policy negotiations and subsequent outcomes. The 
burden of assisting and protecting displaced populations 
cannot be allowed to fall on the shoulders of most affected 
states alone.
Nature and purpose of this report
This report explores how environmental shocks and stresses, 
especially those related to climate change, can push people to 
leave their homes in search of “greener pastures” … or just to 
survive.  In order to make informed decisions, policymakers and 
Key findings
Climate change is already contributing to displacement •	
and migration. Although economic and political factors are 
the dominant drivers of displacement and migration today, 
climate change is already having a detectable effect. 
The breakdown of ecosystem-dependent livelihoods is likely to •	
remain the premier driver of long-term migration during the 
next two to three decades. Climate change will exacerbate this 
situation unless vulnerable populations, especially the poorest, 
are assisted in building climate-resilient livelihoods.
Disasters continue to be a major driver of shorter-term •	
displacement and migration. As climate change increases the 
Policy decisions made today will determine whether 
migration becomes a matter of choice amongst a 
range of adaptation options, or merely a matter of 
survival due to a collective failure by the international 
community to provide better alternatives.
vinclusive, transparent, and accountable adaptation planning •	
with the effective participation of especially vulnerable 
populations. 
Prioritize the world’s most vulnerable populations
Establish mechanisms and binding commitments to ensure that 
adaptation funding reaches the people that need it most.
Negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are currently focused on how to 
generate sufficient funds for adaptation in developing countries 
and how the funds should be managed. These are important 
questions. However, it is equally important to determine how 
funds will be channeled so that they reach the people who 
need them most.  Objective criteria for assessing vulnerability 
to the negative impacts of climate change—including people’s 
risk of displacement—should be developed to guide priority 
assistance. 
Include migration in adaptation strategies
Recognize and facilitate the role that migration will inevitably play 
in individual, household and national adaptation strategies.
For millennia, people have engaged in long- and short-term 
migration as an adaptive response to climatic stress.  Millions 
of individuals and households are employing a variant of this 
strategy today. Human mobility—permanent and temporary, 
internal and cross border—must be incorporated into rather 
than excluded from international and national adaptation plans. 
This can be done in a variety of ways at a number of levels and 
may include:
measures to facilitate and strengthen the benefits of migrant •	
remittances;
the rights-based resettlement of populations living in low-•	
lying coastal areas and small island states.1 
Environmentally, socially and economically sustainable 
resettlement meeting human rights standards (as reflected 
inter alia in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement) 
can be costly; and international agreements must address how 
these and related needs will be met.  Existing mechanisms for 
adaptation funding, which rely on voluntary contributions, 
have failed to deliver. Therefore, future agreements under the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change must establish 
binding commitments for historic high emitters. These funds 
must be new and additional to existing commitments, such 
as those for Official Development Assistance. 
Close the gaps in protection
Integrate climate change into existing international and national 
frameworks for dealing with displacement and migration.
The unique challenges posed by climate change must be factored 
into norms and legal instruments dealing with displacement and 
migration.  Especially important conundrums surround:
disappearing states and non-viable homelands. •	 Unlike some 
people displaced by conflict or persecution who may one 
day return home, those displaced by the chronic impacts of 
climate change (e.g. inadequate rainfall and sea level rise) 
will require permanent resettlement. 
irrevocably deteriorating living conditions•	 . Climate change 
will result in cases that do not fit into current distinctions 
between voluntary and forced migration. At present, people 
who move due to gradually worsening living conditions may 
be categorized as voluntary economic migrants and denied 
recognition of their special protection needs.
 
In order to satisfactorily address such challenges, duty-bearers will 
need clear guidelines for protecting the rights of environmentally-
induced migrants. 
Strengthen the capacity of national and international institutions 
to protect the rights of persons displaced by climate change. 
Institutions tasked with protecting the basic rights of migrants 
and displaced persons are already under-funded and overstretched. 
Climate change will add to their strain, making the practice of 
protection even more difficult.  The international community 
must, therefore, begin substantial discussions about how to 
realize its duties to protect migrants and displaced persons under 
conditions of radical environmental change. 
Policy Recommendations 
New thinking and practical approaches are needed to address the 
threats that climate-related migration poses to human security. 
These include the following principles and commitments for 
action by stakeholders at all levels:
Avoid dangerous climate change
Reduce greenhouse gas emissions to safe levels. 
The international community has until December 2009, at the 
Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to agree on a way forward. If this 
deadline isn’t met, we will almost surely shoot past any safe 
emissions scenario and commit future generations to a much 
more dangerous world in which climate change-related migration 
and displacement, on a truly massive scale, is unavoidable.
Focus on human security
Protect the dignity and basic rights of persons displaced by 
climate change.
Climate-related displacement and migration should be treated, 
first and foremost, as a “human security” issue. Sensationalist 
warnings must not be permitted to trigger reactionary policies 
aimed at blocking the movement of “environmental refugees” 
without genuine concern for their welfare.
Invest in resilience
Increase people’s resilience to the impacts of climate change so 
that fewer are forced to migrate.
The breakdown of natural-resource dependent livelihoods is likely 
to remain the premier driver of long-term migration during the 
next two to three decades. Climate change will exacerbate the 
situation unless vulnerable populations, especially the poorest, 
are assisted in building climate-resilient livelihoods. This will 
require substantial investment in: 
in situ•	  adaptation measures including, for instance, water-
wise irrigation systems, low/no-till agricultural practices, 
income diversification, and disaster risk management; 
the empowerment of women and other marginalized social •	
groups to overcome the additional barriers they face to 
adaptation; and  
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1Until recently, climate change research and negotiations have 
focused almost exclusively on the imperative of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Now, however, it is clear that emissions 
reductions efforts have been too little, too late.2 Therefore, the 
challenges and complex politics of adaptation are joining those 
of mitigation at the centre of policy debates.
It is, therefore, crucial for the international community to 
accelerate learning about effective adaptation. One of the most 
important tasks will be to improve our understanding of how 
environmental change affects human mobility. In any given 
location, migration could be an adaptation strategy. But forced 
migration and displacement may well be indicators of woefully 
inadequate adaptive capacity.
Migration and global environmental change
Our world has experienced profound climatic changes before. What 
appears to be different this time is that one species, humans,  is 
contributing to the change, and that climate change is impacting 
the ecosystems on which it depends. 
Environmentally-induced migration and displacement has the 
potential to become an unprecedented phenomenon—both in 
terms of scale and scope. Its effects on the global economy, 
international development, and national budgets could have 
significant implications for almost all dimensions of human security 
and wellbeing, in addition to political and state security.
Migration—whether permanent or temporary, internal or 
international—has always been a possible adaptation strategy 
for people facing environmental changes. Pre-history and history 
are marked by migration and displacement from one climate 
zone to another, as people sought out environments that would 
support survival as well as aspirations for a better life. Some 
waves of migration and displacement have been associated with 
cultural collapse, as familiar landscapes no longer provided safe 
or supporting habitats and livelihoods for people.
Today, environmental change, including climate change, presents 
a new threat to human security and a new situation for human 
mobility. By 2050 when human population is projected to peak, 
some 9 billion people will live on Earth. The majority of them will 
live in urban areas with crushing environmental footprints. Many 
megacities are located in areas prone to sea level rise. Climate 
change will visit urban and rural areas alike with increasingly 
frequent and violent hazard events. Flooding, intense storms, 
or droughts, or more gradual but significant changes in regional 
climates place great stress on livelihood systems. These pressures 
will contribute to migration and displacement, along with myriad 
other factors.
In coming decades, climate change will motivate or force millions 
of people to leave their homes in search of viable livelihoods and 
safety. Although the precise number of migrants and displaced 
people may elude science for some time, the mass of people on 
the move will likely be staggering and surpass any historical 
antecedent. 
Most people will seek shelter in their own countries while others 
will cross borders in search of better chances. Some migration 
and displacement will be prevented through adaptation measures, 
including changes in agricultural productivity and integrated water 
management. However, poorer countries are under-equipped to 
implement wide-spread adaptation activities; and migration will 
be the only option for many people in the South. Our responses 
to climate change today will help determine whether migration 
will be a matter of choice in a wider range of adaptation options, 
or whether forced migration and displacement will be a matter 
of mere survival due to a collective failure to provide adequate 
adaptation alternatives.
New thinking and the contribution of this report
New thinking and practical approaches are needed to address 
the threats that environmental change including climate 
change poses for migration and displacement. Migration is a 
significant—and growing response to climate change, yet 
neither the literature on climate change nor on human mobility 
yet fully reflects this adaptation option, its impacts, or policy 
alternatives. Policy-makers require better information, empirical 
data, and analysis of both the threats and potential solutions. 
This report seeks to respond to that need, and helps to fill the 
gaps by providing:
empirical evidence•	  from a first-time multi-continent survey of 
environmental change and human mobility;3
original maps of climate change impacts and population •	
distributions, representing some of the major processes 
associated with climate change, and some of the major 
human-ecological systems where these changes could prompt 
migration and displacement. Presenting recent country case 
studies, the paper looks at current patterns of climate change 
and migration for glacier melt and the major river systems in 
Asia, drying trends in Central America and Western Africa, 
flooding and sea level rise in major deltas of the world, and 
sea level rise in low-lying Small Island developing states (for 
details, see Technical Annex: Data and Methods);
policy recommendations•	  that reflect the collective thinking 
of key multi-lateral and research institutions, as well as non-
governmental organizations working directly with many of 
the world’s most vulnerable populations.
What this report does not do 
This report does not attempt to provide estimates of the 
numbers of people that may move or be forced to move in 
response to environmental factors including climate change. 
The report does not attempt to indicate specific geographical 
destinations for migrants in the future. The report does not 
attempt to draw causal relationships between climate change 
and migration or displacement, but rather relies on current 
scientific understanding of environmental processes and how 
these processes can affect human mobility. The authors hope 
that this report will be useful in discussions of where migration 
and displacement pressures are currently and where they may 
emerge in the future, related to phenomena such as glacial 
melting, drying trends, extreme events like flooding, and sea 
level rise. The report is intended to present plausible future 
developments that provide decision makers a basis for focusing 
their discussions on the role of human mobility in adaptation.
1. Introduction
2Multiple drivers
Today, environmental change including climate change contributes 
to human mobility embedded in linked environmental and social 
processes.4 Social system characteristics including social networks 
play a mediating role in how environmental change affects whether 
people move away or stay at home.5 Migration can represent a 
response to changing environmental and economic conditions, 
such as a farmer´s choice to migrate due to failing crops and 
insecure livelihood prospects. Migration can also exacerbate 
environmental and economic problems in receiving areas. For 
example, urban areas attract migrants seeking better lives. 
High in-migration contributes to crowding and environmental/
sanitation issues in slums. 
Studies also point towards urbanization as a force driving regional 
warming (heat islands) which can 
exacerbate drying trends, among other 
problems.6 Some of these cities, such 
as Dhaka, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, 
Shanghai and Tianjin, Alexandria and 
Cairo, Mumbai and Kolkata, Jakarta, 
Tokyo and Osaka-Kobe, Lagos, Bangkok, 
New York City, and Los Angeles, are 
located in areas exposed to sea level 
rise. Sea level rise could motivate 
resettlement, forced migration, or 
other forms of human mobility.7
Environmental change has a multiplier 
effect on other migration drivers.8 As 
an illustration, land degradation in 
Niger has undermined the resilience 
of farmers to recurring drought.9 
More erratic weather, rising sea level 
and other climate change impacts 
will exacerbate both migration pressures and environmental 
degradation.10
What is certain from empirical and theoretical research on 
environmentally-induced migration, in all its varieties, is that 
environmental change is one of many contributing factors.
Climate change & mobility: framing the issue
Terms and concepts such as environmental or climate change 
migration, environmentally-induced or forced migration, ecological 
or environmental refugees, and climate change refugees are used 
throughout the emerging literature, with no general agreement on 
precise definition.16 The main reason for the lack of definitions for 
migration caused in part by environmental change and degradation 
is linked to two issues: the challenge of isolating environmental 
factors from other migration drivers, 
and the possible institutional and 
governance implications of defining 
this range of environmentally-related 
migration.17
This report relies on a working definition 
provided by the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) for “environmentally-
induced migrants” including those made 
mobile in part due to climate change: 
“Environmental migrants are persons or 
groups of persons who, for compelling 
reasons of sudden or progressive changes 
in the environment that adversely affect 
their lives or living conditions, are 
obliged to leave their habitual homes, 
or choose to do so, either temporarily or 
permanently, and who move either within 
their country or abroad.”18
2. Adaptation, or failure to adapt?
How many people will be uprooted 
by environmental change?
Estimates of the numbers of migrants 
and projections of future numbers are 
divergent and controversial, ranging from 
25 to 50 million by the year 201011 to 
almost 700 million by 2050.12 IOM takes 
the middle road with an estimate of 200 
million environmentally-induced migrants 
by 2050.13 The first controversy concerns 
the categorization of people made mobile 
by environmental factors including climate 
change. Some organisations refer to 
“environmental refugees” while others, 
following the strong position of UNHCR, 
stress that the word “refugee” has a specific 
legal meaning in the context of the 1951 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees.14 Terms such as “environmental 
migrants” and “environmentally motivated 
migrants” have, therefore, been introduced 
as alternatives.15
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Emergency housing for internally displaced persons in 
the Democratic Replublic of the Congo.
33.  Climate change and 
human mobility 
This section explores the regional dynamics of climate change 
processes and human mobility, looking at glacial melt, drying 
trends, flooding and sea level rise in some of the world’s hotspot 
areas. The key contribution of this report is the combination of 
unique maps of climate change-related trends and population 
distribution patterns, and fieldwork exploring the impacts of 
environmental change on migration, particularly the EACH-FOR 
project.
The point of departure for this paper is the underlying hypothesis 
that environmental change affects human mobility most directly 
through livelihoods which are dependent on ecosystem services, 
such as agriculture, herding and fishing. This hypothesis was 
formed after a series of field investigations where researchers 
assessed the nature of the linkages between environmental 
stressors and migration. In the EACH-FOR project, the majority 
of migrants interviewed indicated that if the environment 
had affected a decision to migrate, it was most often because 
environmental changes had made it difficult for the individual or 
family to earn a living. These observations led to the formation 
of the hypothesis above.
In this section, the reader follows a journey from the water 
towers of Asia—the Himalayan glaciers—to the drylands of 
Central America and Western Africa (the Sahel), then on to 
three of the world’s major deltas (the Ganges, the Mekong, and 
the Nile). The journey ends with some of the low lying island 
states of Tuvalu and Maldives. Each area highlighted in this 
section has one map accompanied by a box explaining some of 
the key messages of each map, followed by findings from the 
field about the relationship between climate change, migration, 
and displacement.
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5Globally, glaciers are retreating at alarming rates.19 Glaciers are 
slow moving masses of ice that store accumulated snowfall over 
decades and even centuries. Glaciers flow down mountainsides, 
melting at the lower ends while more snow accumulates at the 
upper ends. Because of this constant regeneration through 
winter snow pack, they store water during winter months 
and feed rivers during summer months, regulating the flow 
downstream.20 
Shrinking glaciers provide a one-time “dividend” of water release 
to downstream regions.21 As the storage capacity of glaciers 
is lost, flooding risks increase in the medium term. This can 
affect rural agriculture and urban areas located in river deltas. 
Once the glacier disappears, it no longer releases water during 
the summer months. The disappearance of glaciers implies 
decreased water supply and untimely flows—that is, coming 
in the wrong (non-cropping) season. The only alternative for 
seasonal water storage are dams, which are costly to construct 
and can have significant environmental and social impacts, 
resulting in the displacement of thousands or, in rare cases, 
millions of people.22
The Himalayas are known as the Water Tower of Asia. The 
glacier-fed rivers originating from the Himalaya mountain 
ranges surrounding the Tibetan Plateau comprise the largest 
river run-off from any single location in the world. 23 The rivers 
that drain these mountains move through some of the most 
populous areas in the world. In the year 2000, the river basins of 
the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Salween, Mekong, 
Yangtze, and Huang He (Yellow) Rivers collectively supported 
a population of 1.4 billion people, or almost a quarter of the 
world’s population.  
Himalayan glaciers are already in retreat.24 Their dependence 
on glacier runoff makes downstream populations particularly 
vulnerable to the consequences. The Indus River valley supports 
one of the largest irrigation works in the world (16.2m ha). 
Approximately 90 percent of Pakistan’s crop production is grown 
under irrigation, and all of the water comes from barrages along 
the Indus. The Ganges, Yangtze, and Yellow Rivers also have 
large areas under irrigation —17.9m ha, 5.4m ha, and 2.0m ha, 
respectively.
Hydropower installations along the Mekong and Yangtze are also 
significant suppliers of electricity to urban markets. The recently 
completed Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze, the world’s largest 
hydroelectric installation, will have a power generation capacity 
of 22,500 MW once all generators are installed, more than 20 
times the capacity of an average coal-fired or nuclear power 
plant. The project, however, has already displaced 1–2 million 
people.25 Plans are underway to add significant hydropower 
generating capacity to the Mekong over the coming decades. 
Under scenarios of rapid glacier melt, it is likely that hundreds 
more water retention dams will be constructed. Collectively, these 
will have significant impacts on downstream flow regimes and 
deltas, which are already starved of flood waters and replenishing 
sediment.26 Population displacement and resettlement will 
become larger issues in these areas at significant scales.
As a result of the intensification of cultivation in irrigated areas 
and power generation, many millions indirectly depend on the 
food and energy resources generated by these great rivers. But 
the rivers also provide direct livelihoods to all those employed 
in irrigated agriculture, small-scale fishing, and aquaculture, and 
they are at the heart of cultural traditions. For example, to Hindus 
the Ganges is sacred, and is personified in Mother Gaṅgā (Gaṅgā 
Mātā), representative of life-giving maternal waters.27 Changes 
in the rivers and livelihoods dependent on them could bring 
profound economic, cultural, and demographic impacts.
Should flow reductions become acute, the potential for migration 
out of irrigated areas could be significant.28 Although destination 
areas are hard to predict, it is likely that most migrating or 
displaced people would move to small to medium sized cities 
inland, and a smaller number would move to large megacities 
along the coasts or on the main branches of river systems (e.g. 
Delhi).29 Movement from interior to coastal areas—a pattern that 
has been prevalent in China since the early 1980s—will result 
in larger populations vulnerable to sea level rise, and possibly 
to extreme floods from upstream regions as the regulating 
effect of glaciers diminish.30 However, many South Asia cities 
lack the capacity to absorb significant migration streams. There 
is potential for significant water saving efficiencies in irrigated 
areas of Asia, and if properly implemented this may forestall 
displacements of farmers. 31
What does this map tell us?
The map depicts glaciers (white with blue border) in the Himalayas and the major rivers that flow from them. These rivers support 
large irrigated areas (dark green) and major population centers (red), yet the glaciers that feed them are in retreat. Reductions of 
river flows will affect irrigated areas, but the potential for migration out of agricultural areas is hard to predict, and will depend on 
adaptation responses such as dam construction and more efficient irrigation technologies. Broader impacts on food security for this 
highly populous region could be significant. In the absence of diversification and adaptation/mitigation measures, as water resources 
gradually diminish agriculture livelihoods will become unsustainable, and people may be forced to leave. Paradoxically, measures to 
store water and ward off a water crisis related to shrinking glaciers could result in further displacement and resettlement.
3.1 Asia: Glacier melt and irrigated agricultural systems
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7Multiple climate-related hazards threaten Mexico and Central 
America. This region is known for the severity of cyclone events, 
with Hurricane Mitch in 1998 leaving devastation in its wake in 
Honduras and Nicaragua, and Hurricane Stan in 2005 affecting 
Mexico and Guatemala. Tropical storm Noel in 2007 caused heavy 
flooding in the state of Tabasco, where up to 80 percent of the 
state was inundated. Several coastal regions in Mexico will face 
sea level rise, particularly low lying areas of the Gulf Coast and 
the Caribbean.
32 
Of particular concern, however, is the likelihood that the region 
will see persistent declines in precipitation over the course of 
this century. The map at left shows that runoff in the region will
likely decline by at least 5 percent and possibly up to 50 percent, 
with declines getting progressively worse in the semiarid and arid 
north.
33 
Given the region’s mountainous topography, extensive 
irrigation is only practicable in the coastal plains that are 
dominated by wealthy landowners.  Most smallholder farmers will 
remain heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture. However, even 
large-scale irrigated areas, such as those in Sonora and Sinaloa 
states, the breadbasket of Mexico, will be affected as average 
reservoir levels decline. Already, summer droughts during El Niño 
and La Niña events can lead to serious deficits in reservoir levels.
34 
In the case of Guatemala, longer and more intense midsummer 
drought periods have been linked to long-term declines in rainfall 
since the 1970s.
35 
This drought determines the level of success or 
failure of rain-fed agriculture. 
Processes of slow-onset land degradation including deforestation, 
soil erosion, and desertification already affect large parts of the 
Mexico and Central America.
  
In the fragile arid and semi-arid 
ecosystems of northern and north-western Mexico more than 60 
percent of the land is considered to be in a total or accelerated state 
of erosion, and mountainous lands with high slopes throughout the 
region have suffered deforestation and soil erosion. 
EACH-FOR studies were conducted in the hurricane-prone 
Chiapas state of Southern Mexico, and in Tlaxcala state, a highly 
desertified state in Central Mexico. Both areas are considered 
very vulnerable to the effects of climate change, particularly in 
combination with deforestation, erosion, and underlying poverty 
and social vulnerability.
36 
Migration is already a response in Mexico to changing 
environmental conditions, the 1980s agricultural crisis and 
economic liberalization.
37 
When Hurricane Stan passed through 
Chiapas, many people were surprised by the violence of its 
impact. One interviewee noted, “The river took away our homes 
and properties; we also were close to being taken away.”
38 
Yet 
when very low-income villagers were asked whether migration 
was an option for them, most respondents underlined that they 
have no other place to go. Yet, for those who are better off or 
who have relatives abroad, migration is an option. 
The recurrence of natural disaster combined with the presence of 
relatives who emigrated due to disasters in the past increases the 
desire of farmers to emigrate.
39 
On the other hand, diversification 
of livelihood strategies
40 and government investment on disaster 
risk management decreases the likelihood of migration, regardless 
of poverty status.
41 
Some studies have shown links between desertification and 
migration in Mexico,
42 
noting the impacts on agricultural 
livelihoods. In dryland areas such as Tlaxcala, which depends on 
rain-fed agriculture, the majority of interviewees complained of 
shifting rainfall periods, which increases uncertainty and causes 
a decline in crop yields and incomes. The area of Tlaxcala is 
projected to have a 10–20 percent decline in runoff in association 
with climate change. This indirect link between climatic changes 
and migration was noted frequently in fieldwork, mostly related 
to unreliable harvests linked to changing rainfall patterns. Return 
migration, and seasonal migration as a livelihood diversification 
strategy have been documented in this area. As explained by two 
interviewees: 
“…when our harvest is bad, we have to rely on ourselves. 
Many of us had to leave, to Canada or the United States… 
the money I made there… was a big help for my family. 
Without that income, it would have become extremely 
difficult.”
43
 
“My grandfather, father and I have worked these lands. But 
times have changed…the rain is coming later now, so that we 
produce less. The only solution is to go away, at least for a 
while [to the United States]. But leaving my village forever? 
No. I was raised here and here I will stay.”
44
The relevance temporary migration and remittances to cope 
with unreliable income from agriculture has often been 
highlighted in the environment-migration literature but not 
always sufficiently considered in adaptation and mitigation 
policies. 
Internal and international migration patterns are well 
established in Mexico and Central America,
45 and it is difficult 
to project what effects drying trends associated with climate 
change may have.  It is clear, however, that environmental 
factors like desertification and extreme weather already 
contribute to the regions’ complex pattern of human mobility. 
The opportunity for some people to migrate seasonally, send 
remittances, and return home is an example of migration 
as an adaptation strategy to deteriorating environmental 
conditions. 
What does this map tell us? 
The main map depicts projected changes in runoff by 2080. Runoff is a measure of water availability and represents the amount of 
rainfall that runs off the land surface after accounting for evaporation, plant transpiration, and soil moisture replenishment. Mexico 
and Central America will be widely affected by declines. The map also outlines the Mexican states of Tlaxcala and Chiapas, where EACH-
FOR conducted research. The top left inset map shows average annual runoff for the 1960–1990 period, a baseline against which future 
declines will be applied. The bottom left inset map shows lands suited for rain-fed agriculture, which will be particularly affected by 
progressive drying in the region. Circular, temporary and seasonal migration has traditionally been a means of coping with climate 
variability in these areas, and permanent internal and international migration out of areas dependent on rain-fed agriculture is a 
distinct possibility. The inset on the lower right depicts cyclone frequency in the 1980–2000 period. Some models show the number 
of category 4 and 5 hurricanes increasing in the Caribbean. 
3.2 Mexico and Central America: Migration in response to drought and disasters
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9Land degradation, desertification, and deforestation are factors 
that potentially result in mobility as a household adaptation 
strategy.46 Land degradation, as defined by Article 1 of the 
Convention to Combat Desertification, is defined as a “reduction 
or loss of biological or economic productivity of ecosystems 
resulting from climatic variations, land uses and a combination 
of processes such as: soil erosion, deterioration of soil properties 
and long-term vegetation loss.” Thus, losses of land productivity 
are inextricably linked to climate change.
Although precise estimates of the land affected by degradation 
are difficult to obtain, some estimates suggest that more than 
one-third of drylands are affected by land degradation.47 Land 
degradation is a major concern in West Africa, where about 65 
percent of the cultivable lands have degraded.48 From 2000-
2005, West and Central Africa lost 1.36m ha of forest cover 
per year, or a total of 67,800 sq km.49 More than 300 million 
people in Africa already live with water scarcity, and areas 
experiencing water shortages are likely to increase by almost 
a third by 2050.50 
West Africa is made up of a diversity of ecosystems, ranging 
from more tropical humid in the South to arid in the North. 
While climate change projections of seasonal or annual 
precipitation are uncertain, the projected increase in intensity 
of rainfall events, superimposed on the region’s already 
high climate variability, is likely going to lead to increased 
frequency of droughts and floods. Water shortage and land 
degradation affect large areas of the Sahel, a region south of 
the Sahara and north of the humid zone that spans west to east 
across nine countries from Mauritania and Senegal to Sudan. 
In the Sahelian zone of Western Africa, two different drought 
events—a large drought from 1968–74 and a slightly less 
intense one from 1982–84—were among the worst on record.51 
During the first drought, more than 100,000 people died, most 
of whom were children.52 By 1974, more than 750,000 people 
in Mali, Niger and Mauritania were totally dependent on food 
aid.53 These droughts and consequent land degradation are 
now understood to have been caused in part by a pattern of 
warming of the tropical oceans which itself may have been 
driven by anthropogenic climate change.54 Such environmental 
pressures could grow in the future with climate change. 
Forty-four percent of West Africa’s population works in the 
agricultural sector, most of them at a subsistence level.55 Despite 
the high dependence on agriculture in this climatically variable 
region, the actual areas under irrigation are among the lowest 
on a per-area basis for any region in the world. For example, in 
Senegal in 2005, only 67,000 ha was irrigated out of 8.8m ha, or 
less than 1 percent of the total.56 Although the Sahel has seen 
a “greening” since the mid-1980s drought, at 2.6 percent the 
region still has the second highest population growth rate in the 
world (after Central Africa).57 This population growth combined 
with climatic trends and land degradation could lead to:
declining per capita production for the  agriculture, including •	
animal husbandry
shortage of fuelwood•	
declining rainfall in some regions with consequences for rain-•	
fed and irrigated agriculture
food shortages and famines in drought years•	
movement to urban areas or to more fertile farming areas, •	
such as recently opened areas in the Savannah zone owing to 
the eradication of river blindness.58 
Migration, particularly circular mobility, is a traditional coping 
mechanism in the region, representing a livelihood diversification 
strategy.59 But in some areas these traditional patterns have 
changed in recent decades.60 Each location has its specific 
characteristics, but migration and pressures on water and land 
systems are common denominators. A significant proportion of 
environmental migrants are displaced due to land degradation 
and drought in the Sahel, though drought-induced migration 
is often only temporary. Generally, there is a large migration 
movement to the coastal and urban agglomerations, and to the 
coastal states.61 
One study of the impact of climate change on drylands in 
West Africa noted that between 1960 and 2000, deteriorating 
situations due to rainfall decreases, land degradation, and 
violence in the arid and semi-arid areas of Senegal, Mali, Burkina 
Faso and Niger resulted in a rapid intra-country migration 
southward and a swelling of big cities like Dakar, Bamako, 
Ouagadougou, Niamey and Kano.62 Estimates for Burkina Faso 
suggest that close to half of the adult population born there has 
moved for at least part of the year to coastal states like Ivory 
Coast and Ghana.63 
Even those not directly dependent on natural resources for their 
livelihoods can be affected by desertification and motivated to 
migrate. One migrant from the Difa region in Niger remarked, 
“I used to live in the Lake Chad region where my activities 
were not directly related to the Lake. I used to be a merchant. 
However, when the lake dried out, people depending on it left 
for other countries and therefore, my business was negatively 
affected and I had to leave for Nigeria.”64 
What does this map tell us?
The main map depicts projected declines in runoff by the year 2080 superimposed on population density. Runoff is a measure 
of water availability, and represents the amount of rainfall that runs off the land surface after accounting for evaporation, plant 
transpiration and soil moisture replenishment. The maroon outlined areas depict EACH-FOR study areas. The lower left inset map 
shows average annual runoff for the 1960–1990 period, a baseline against which future declines are compared. The center inset 
map provides the area suitable for rain-fed agriculture, which largely reflects the population density map. The right inset map 
shows pasture lands distribution, an important livelihood for many in the Sahel. In this region of scarce water resources and high 
climate variability, any decline in runoff or change in rainfall patterns will adversely affect the livelihoods of subsistence farmers 
and pastoralists. Projected drying trends in a context of poverty, inequality, limited diversification options and erratic government 
support could contibute to transform current patterns into a more permanent, long-term dynamic. 
3.3 The Sahel: Pressure on agricultural livelihoods and creeping onward migration
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Traditionally pastoralism has represented an important 
mechanism for adjusting to climate variability, since pastoralists 
can move their herds along with the rainfall.65 A symbiotic 
relationship often formed between herders and agriculturalists, 
with agriculturalists receiving animal manure to fertilize their 
crops in return for allowing livestock to graze on plant stubble. 
However, as the Sahel has become more densely settled, 
increasingly severe conflicts over land and water resources have 
erupted between pastoralists and sedentary farmers.66  
In Senegal, fieldwork revealed that environmental changes 
negatively affect agricultural livelihoods, and contribute to 
migration through different mechanisms. For areas where 
irrigated agriculture is possible, farmers living close to the 
Senegal River expect their way of life will continue to be 
possible and therefore do not intend to migrate in the future. 
But in areas like the Peanut Basin, where land degradation is 
severe, interviewees said they plan to move away if agricultural 
livelihoods do not improve. Most migrants who already migrated 
said they would return home to the countryside if agricultural 
livelihoods improved. In Senegal experts observe an increasing 
movement of people back to the countryside due to the global 
economic crisis. However, that coping mechanism is running 
into counter-pressures because areas people are returning to 
are in many cases already degraded. Conflict over access to land 
seems to be increasing.67
Some farmers do manage to find alternative livelihoods that 
allow them to return home. In Niger, a returned migrant from 
the village Talcho, Filingue (Tilabéri, Niger) remarked, “I lost 
hope in producing crops, since the soil got too poor due to the 
droughts. I used to be a farmer in my home town. Therefore I 
first went to Lomé (Togo) and then Libya. Now, I have decided 
to return back to Niger where I will start a new business with 
the money I managed to collect in Libya.”68 
Rather than returning after migrating, the trend goes in the 
opposite direction.69 People increasingly migrate step-by-step in 
pursuit of environments that will support them. The residents of 
the village Caré in the Tilabéri region of Niger is now home to 
migrants from another village called Farka where soil degradation 
has made crop cultivation impossible. A migrant remarked: 
“We were farmers in Farka, but the production level worsened 
too much and the harvest got completely unreliable due to the 
rain fall shortage and soil degradation. We had no alternative 
revenues. Therefore, we had to flee this village in the year 
1987…there is no other reason why we left the original village; 
if this deterioration in the land quality had not happened, we 
would have stayed. Currently in Caré we are suffering from similar 
problems and might therefore leave the village for another as 
well. We have never planned to leave, but we just ´crept´ after 
our living.”70 
In another study in Burkina Faso, researchers found that people 
from drier regions are more likely to migrate temporarily and 
to a lesser extent permanently to other rural areas (rural–rural 
migration), compared with people from wetter areas. A rainfall 
deficit increases the rural-rural migration but decreases 
migration to abroad. No rush to cities has been observed 
during periods of drought.71 A fisherman in the village of Sirba 
(Tilabéri, Niger) recounts, “I have been suffering from the 
rain water shortage which made the river very shallow and 
decreased my fish production, which had negative implications 
on my income. If the situation does not improve, I might leave 
for another country like some of my friends and relatives did; 
they left for Nigeria and Burkina Faso and settled there.”72 
Studies in other regions support this finding, and suggest 
that environmental conditions often play a more direct role 
in short-term moves rather than long-term ones.73 And yet, 
if environmental changes render “home” unlivable, short-
term migration can develop into a pattern of creeping onward 
movement.
Robert Ford of the Centre for GIS Training and Remote Sensing, 
National University of Rwanda noted, “Those of us living with 
these issues here in Africa are already seeing some major 
movements of people. In many parts of Africa, people living 
on the margin seem to quickly pick up signals that indicate 
whether on balance life is better by going to the city or 
returning to the land. That this much ferment is happening 
now, before climate change really hits, tells me that we had 
better get prepared.”74©
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By the end of 2008, Sudan’s internally displaced population had grown to 4.9 million, making it the largest in the world.  More than 523,032 
Sudanese have fled their country as refugees (UNHCR, June 2008).  The causes of displacement and  migration in Sudan are notoriosuly complicated.  
However, environmental change is broadly recognised as playing an important role.     ©
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Including the Ganges, Bangladesh contains seven major and over 
two hundred minor rivers, all of which define the delta geography 
of Bangladesh and the way of life of its people. Bangladesh is 
one of the most densely populated countries in the world, and 
a large part of its people depends on natural resources for their 
livelihoods. Although flooding is a part of the livelihood structure 
and culture, climate change will accelerate change in this already 
dynamic environment and leave millions of Bangladeshis exposed to 
increased flooding, severe cyclones, and sea level rise impacts.75
More than 5 million Bangladeshis live in areas highly vulnerable 
to cyclones and storm surges, and over half the population 
lives within 100 km of the coast, most of which is less than 
12 meters above sea level.76 Flooding currently displaces about 
500,000 people every year.  In 2007, two extreme weather events 
devastated the country: Flooding caused 3,363 deaths and affected 
10 million people as well as reducing crop yields by 13 percent. 
Just months later, Cyclone Sidr destroyed 1.5 million houses, 
large areas of cropland and mangrove forests, and affected 30 out 
of 64 districts in the country. Millions experienced food insecurity 
(monga) and required evacuation, shelter and relief assistance.77 
As devastating as these cyclones were, early warning systems were 
successful in preventing the deaths of many thousands more. In 
1970 a cyclones caused the deaths of an estimated 300,000, and 
in 1991 another 140,000 died.78
The Bangladesh EACH-FOR case study found that flooding and 
bank erosion are a complex mix of natural and socioeconomic 
processes contributing to population displacement.79 Combined 
with sea level rise, storm surges linked to cyclones could 
temporarily inundate large areas of Bangladesh—one study 
suggested that up to 25 percent of the country could experience 
such a scenario.80 
Temporary migration linked to flooding and other disasters, 
frequently to Dhaka and other urban centers, is viewed as both 
a coping and survival strategy to escape riverbank erosion, the 
devastation of cyclones, and food insecurity. Almost all areas in 
Bangladesh are densely populated and under cultivation, and 
many locations are vulnerable to similar environmental risks. 
There are no guarantees of finding employment or housing in the 
place of destination. 
For coastal fishing villages, cyclones, storm surges, and sea 
level rise pose a formidable adaptation challenge. One fisherman 
interviewed by a journalist during the 2008 cyclone season 
noted, “The sea has been coming closer and closer,” then 
added in Bengali, “Allah jane ke hobe. Sahbi shesh ho jabe.” 
[God only knows what will happen. Everything will come to an 
end.] In spite of accelerated erosion related to stronger and 
higher tides, villagers are determined to stay and pursue their 
livelihoods as long as possible. The same journalist interviewed 
another fisherman who said, “We can´t do anything else, which 
is why we think twice about migrating from here. We know the 
end is coming, but what work will we find to feed our families 
elsewhere?”81
Even if the causes of migration are similar from one person to the 
next, people opt for different strategies in terms of destination 
and timing of migration. But there might be a moment when they 
will not be able to adapt any more. In 20 or 30 years Bangladesh 
may see mass movement of people from flood-prone areas, possibly 
to urban centers. The current structures and organizations to 
help the victims of disasters will not be enough to cope with 
the increase of migration flows in the future. Given the political 
instability of the region, population movements associated with 
climate change could become an issue for regional security. 
However, adaptation strategies could reduce the environmental 
vulnerability and increase the resilience of local populations. 
EACH-FOR research suggests that the population is already working 
to adapt to the new situation, mainly by leaving agriculture for 
other livelihoods such as shrimp farming.82 The worsening of 
the environmental situation in the Ganges delta, however, could 
render migration as one of the most realistic options available for 
some Bangladeshi people.
What does this map tell us?
The main map depicts areas of sea level rise at 1 and 2 meters (dark and light blue, respectively) on a population density map with 
urban extents delineated. It also shows the regions of the EACH-FOR study areas in the lower delta. The Ganges delta supported 
a population of 144 million in 2000, out of which 9.4 million lived in areas that would be inundated by a 2 meter sea level rise. 
The top left inset map shows those areas most frequently impacted by tropical cyclones. Low elevation areas in the southeastern 
corner of the delta are most affected. The bottom left inset map depicts the area affected by the 2007 flood. The middle inset 
map shows the distribution of agricultural lands. The delta has 8.5 million ha of agricultural lands, of which 486 thousand ha 
would be inundated by a 2 meter sea level rise. In the Ganges Delta, living with varying water levels is a way of life. Migration, 
particularly towards coastal urban centers, has emerged as a coping mechanism when extreme events endanger life and livelihoods. 
With projected sea level rise, combined with the possibility of more intense flooding and storm surges, migration may become a 
necessity for many communities, at least for parts of the year.
3.4 The Ganges Delta: Temporary migration as a survival strategy
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Environmental degradation, particularly impacts caused by 
flooding, is a contributing factor to rural out migration and 
displacement in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. The Vietnamese 
portion of the Mekong Delta is home to 18 million people, or 
22 percent of Vietnam´s population. It provides 40 percent of 
Vietnam´s cultivated land surface and produces more than a 
quarter of the country´s GDP. Half of Vietnam´s rice is produced in 
the Mekong Delta, 60 percent of its fish-shrimp harvest, and 80 
percent of Vietnam´s fruit crop. Ninety percent of Vietnam´s total 
national rice export comes from the Mekong. 
Flooding plays an important role in the economy and culture of 
the area. People live with and depend on flood cycles, but within 
certain bounds. For example, flood depths of between half a 
meter up to three meters are considered part of the normal flood 
regime upon which livelihoods depend. These are so-called “nice 
floods” [ngâp nông] by Vietnamese living in the delta, such as 
upstream in the An Giang Province. Flood depths beyond this such 
as between three and four meters [ngâp vùa], however, challenge 
resilience capacities of affected people and often have harrowing 
effects on livelihoods.
Floods exceeding the four meter mark, called “ngâp sâu” for 
severe flooding, have increased in magnitude and frequency in 
Vietnam in recent decades.83 In Phnom Penh (Cambodia) one 
migrant from the Delta noted, “Flooding occurs every year at 
my former living place. I could not grow and harvest crops. Life 
therefore was very miserable. Besides, my family did not know 
what else we could do other than growing rice and fishing. 
Flooding sometimes threatened our lives. So we came here to 
find another livelihood.”84
Another migrant said, “My family had crop fields but in recent 
years, floods occurred very often so the crop was not stable. 
In addition, the price of fertilizer increased very fast, and the 
diseases of the rice plant are too much, so the crop yield was 
nothing. Even sometimes the yield was not enough to cover the 
amount required for living.”85
“Natural hazards, in combination with the stress placed on the 
environment due to rapid socioeconomic development within 
Vietnam and upstream South-east Asian countries, overlaid 
with the threats posed to Vietnam by climate change, places 
Vietnam’s natural resources and those who depend upon them 
for their livelihoods in a precarious position. In the face of 
environmental stressors, people in the Mekong Delta adapt 
in various ways. One type of adaptation mechanism may be 
migration, particularly in light of the rapid socio-economic 
changes that Vietnam is currently experiencing, which create 
stronger pull factors towards urban environments”.86
Fieldwork from the EACH-FOR project indicated that lack of 
alternative livelihoods, deteriorating ability to make a living 
in the face of flooding, together with mounting debt, can 
contribute to the migration “decisions” in the Mekong Delta. 
People directly dependent on agriculture for their livelihood 
(such as rice farmers) are especially vulnerable when successive 
flooding events destroy crops. This can trigger a decision to 
migrate elsewhere in search of an alternative livelihood. During 
the flooding season, people undertake seasonal labor migration 
and movement towards urban centers to bolster livelihoods. 
As an extreme coping mechanism, anecdotal information 
from fieldwork pointed to human trafficking as one strategy 
adopted by some families who have suffered from water-related 
stressors. 
A migrant interviewee referred to the financial vulnerability of 
her family related to flooding, “Disasters occurred so often - my 
family lost the crop, my family had to borrow money to spend. 
Now, my family is not able to pay off the loan so I have to come 
here to work to help my family to pay the loan.”87
The government in Vietnam has a program known as “living 
with floods.”88 This program may become more important as 
the impacts of climate change become more pronounced. The 
government, as part of this flood management strategy, is 
currently resettling people living in vulnerable zones along river 
banks in the An Giang province.89 Almost 20,000 landless and 
poor households in this province are targeted for relocation 
by 2020. Households are selected for resettlement based on 
a number of factors related to the environment, such as living 
in an area at risk of natural calamities (flooding, landslides) or 
river bank erosion. These resettlement programs allow families 
to take up a five year interest free loan to enable them to 
purchase a housing plot and basic house frame. Households 
then often need a further loan to complete building the house.90 
The clusters provide few infrastructure services like access to 
schools, health, or water and sewage treatment facilities.91 
People planned for relocation are usually the landless who 
have nowhere else to move if their houses collapse and are 
often too poor to move to urban areas. For these people, 
social networks provide the link to livelihoods—most rely on 
day-to-day employment as laborers. Although the “residential 
clusters” are usually located only 1–2 kilometers away from 
the former residence, moving people out of established social 
networks threatens their livelihoods and contributes to a sense 
of isolation. The resettlement clusters are not yet planned in a 
way that allows participation of potential residents.
The Vietnamese strategy of “living with floods” will combine 
resettlement, shifting livelihoods (i.e. from rice to fishery-
based jobs), and some migration. In the future one out of every 
ten Vietnamese may face displacement by sea level rise in the 
Mekong Delta.92 
What does this map tell us?
The main map depicts areas of sea level rise at 1 and 2 meters (dark and light blue, respectively) on a population density map 
with urban extents delineated. It also shows the regions of the EACH-FOR study areas. The Mekong delta supported a population 
of 28.5 million in 2000, out of which 14.2 million lived in areas that would be inundated by a 2m sea level rise. The upper left 
inset map shows the area flooded in the year 2000 when unusually widespread monsoon floods deluged nearly 800,000 sq. km of 
land in Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. The inset map below it shows the distribution of agricultural lands. The delta has 
3 million ha of agricultural lands, of which 1.4 million ha would be inundated by a 2 meter sea level rise. Resettlement programs 
are already underway in some areas of the delta, and could become more widespread under certain sea level rise scenarios.
3.5 The Mekong Delta: Living with floods and resettlement
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In Egypt slow-onset events like sea level rise and desertification 
affect the Nile Delta.93 The total area of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt is about one million km², most of which has an arid and 
hyper-arid climate. The most productive zones in Egypt are 
the Nile Delta and Nile Valley (3 percent of the total land). 
Projected increases in sea levels will pressure a quickly growing 
population into more concentrated areas. Desertification and 
soil degradation claim large swaths of land on the Eastern and 
Western Nile Delta. Large swaths of land may be rendered unusable 
by the dual climate change-related forces of desertification 
and sea level rise. In the future, sea level rise could affect an 
additional 16 percent of the population.94
The overall area influenced by the active encroachment of sand 
and sand dunes is estimated to be roughly 800,000 hectares.95 
Land productivity has diminished by about 25 percent compared 
to its original productivity.96 The annual erosion rate has been 
estimated between 0.8 and 5.3 ton/ha/year.97 Desertification 
and land degradation drive some people to migrate internally in 
search of livelihoods. 
The government of Egypt combats desertification through an 
internal migration scheme related to the Mobarak National 
Project in the Western and Eastern Delta. The program was 
initially designed to alleviate environmental programs but also 
unemployment, poverty, and overpopulation in Cairo, Beheira, 
Kafr El-Sheikh, and Qalioubia. This project aimed to create an 
internal urban-to-rural migration flow towards the edges of 
the Delta. 
People who were resettled in the Eastern Delta were mainly 
unemployed young men from urban slums. In contrast, the 
people who moved to the Western Delta were mainly farmers 
affected by a law that favored land owners who could easily 
drive away share croppers from desirable agricultural areas. After 
eviction, the share croppers were moved by the government to 
the Western Delta. 
The program allocated each sharecropper/farmer in the Eastern 
and Western Delta a land parcel of 10,500m², and often 
additional migrants came to work as peasants in these areas. 
Soon, however, reclaimed areas began to manifest soil and water 
salinity problems. When it became too expensive to dig new wells 
for groundwater, many landowners sold their land and evicted the 
migrant peasants. One farmer remarked, “When I left my original 
village called Bassioun-Gharbia in Mid-Delta, I started working 
in a newly reclaimed land in the desert. After a while the land 
was affected by the problem of ground water salinity. The owner 
of the land decided to sell the land…I had to leave the land 
and then I came here to Embaba, a desert location in Western 
Cairo.”98 The new immigrants received shelter and agricultural 
extension and veterinary services from the government and 
NGOs. Government funding provided migrants with pesticides and 
artificial crop pollination. Yet initial investments and incentives 
to encourage poor people to migrate to new areas tapered off 
with time. The Western and Eastern Delta lack access to potable 
water, proper infrastructure, public facilities, schools, health 
care, and well-functioning sewage systems. Consequently, many 
migrants did not stay and others are expected to leave either to 
other regions or to return to their original regions. Today, only 
half of designated resettlement land has been utilized.
With the dual processes of sea level rise and desertification, the 
question arises where people in the densely-populated Nile Delta 
will go? EACH-FOR research suggested that many people do not 
want to migrate away from their lands of origin. One interviewee 
living along the Nile River noted, “I would have a reason to move 
because of the water shortage and soil degradation…and crop 
yields are declining. However, I cannot leave my land. I have 
inherited this land from my father a long time ago and cannot 
just leave it. I got used to the place, I have my big family and 
my friends here. I have never left this place, I have never gone 
to Cairo before, so how shall I simply leave it now and migrate to 
somewhere else? We will have to economize in our consumption 
and hope that things will get better.”99
What does this map tell us?
The main map depicts areas of sea level rise at 1 and 2 meters (dark and light blue, respectively) on a population density map 
with urban extents delineated. It also shows the boundary of the Nile delta. The Nile delta supported a population of 40.2 
million in 2000, of which  10.7 million lived in areas that would be inundated by a 2 meter sea level rise. The inset map shows 
the distribution of agricultural lands. The delta has 1.5 million ha of agricultural lands, of which 518 thousand ha would be 
inundated by a 2 meter sea level rise. These processes could compress people into a smaller livable area and contribute to 
deteriorating living standards.
3.6 The Nile Delta: Between desertification and sea level rise
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Small island states are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise due 
to climate change. According to the IPCC:
Sea-level rise is expected to exacerbate inundation, storm 
surges, erosion and other coastal hazards, thus threatening 
vital infrastructure, settlements and facilities that support the 
livelihood of island communities. (…) There is strong evidence 
that under most climate change scenarios, water resources 
in small islands are likely to be seriously compromised. (…) 
Climate change is likely to heavily impact coral reefs, fisheries 
and other marine-based resources. (…) It is very likely that 
subsistence and commercial agriculture on small islands will 
be adversely affected by climate change.100
What do these maps tell us? 
These maps depict the areas of the capitals of Tuvalu (Funafuti) 
and the Maldives (Malé) that will be affected by a 1m (dark blue) 
and 2m (light blue) sea level rise. Low lying islands face multiple 
challenges of development, storm surges and cyclones, coastal 
erosion, and the specter of sea level rise. For some 40 small island 
3.7 Tuvalu and The Maldives: Sea level rise and small island developing states
Tuvalu
As one of the smallest and most remote low-lying atoll countries on 
earth, Tuvalu exemplifies a country whose existence is threatened 
by sea level rise. Tuvalu´s territory covers over 750,000 km2, yet 
only 26 km2 is dry land with no point more than 5 meters above 
high tide. 
Its low elevation makes Tuvalu highly vulnerable to sea-level 
rise, storm surges, “king tides”, and other climatic events which 
affect the entire population of the country (all Tuvaluans live 
on the coastline). Tuvalu’s environmental problems are further 
compounded by water shortage, waste disposal and demographic 
pressures. Local knowledge of global warming is variable, but 
increasingly frequent saltwater flooding, accelerated coastal 
erosion and worsening agriculture provide day-to-day evidence 
of a changing environment. The adaptive capacity of many 
Tuvaluans is already exceeded with storm surges and king 
tides. With the possibility of sea level rise of one meter this 
century, even if the surface area is not completely submerged, 
the question arises how long people there can remain and lead 
normal lives.
Migration patterns in Tuvalu follow two paths: from outer islands 
to Funafuti, and from Tuvalu to Fiji and New Zealand. Currently 
about 3,000 Tuvaluans have migrated to Auckland, New Zealand, 
many of whom were prompted at least in part by concerns about 
the environment. One interviewee noted his decision to migrate 
is out of fear that Tuvalu will be flooded: “I don´t want to wake 
up one morning with the island washed away.  Look at what 
happened in the Solomon Islands! I prefer to leave now before I 
have no other choice.”101 
Uncertainties about the future seem to be pre-eminent migration 
drivers, even more than actual environmental concerns. Almost 
all migrants interviewed in New Zealand indicated that climate 
change and rising sea levels had contributed to their decision 
to migrate. All interviewees noted a concern that their country 
could be inundated permanently. One migrant noted, “When I 
left, it was clear that it would be getting worse year after year…I 
return once a year, because I still have family in Tuvalu. Maybe 
they´ll come as well to New Zealand, one day. That depends on 
how bad it gets. (…) I don´t know if Tuvalu will disappear or 
what (sic), but I don´t think people have a future in Tuvalu, it’s 
going to get worse.”102 
Although media reports have suggested a nation-wide 
resettlement agreement made between New Zealand and Tuvalu, 
currently there are labor migration agreements with New 
Malé
Zealand, but not explicit policies to accept Pacific Islanders who 
have been displaced due to rising sea levels. Interviews from 
fieldwork revealed mixed views on migration, ranging from the 
most common perception of resignation and despair, to hope 
that the international community will rally to effectively battle 
climate change and prevent sea level rise and other harrowing 
consequences. Some believe that climate negotiations that set 
aside sufficient adaptation financing could preempt a need to 
migrate due to changing climate and sea level rise:
“The international community needs to do something to help us. 
We´re not responsible for climate change, so our country cannot 
disappear. The other countries need to fix this problem.”103
Since Tuvalu joined the United Nations in 2000, it has played 
an active role in the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), 
and has used international fora like the climate negotiations 
to attract the world´s attention to the specific vulnerabilities 
of small island states and the need to identify acceptable 
adaptation alternatives in good time.
The Maldives
The Maldives is an atoll country comprised of 1,200 islands and 
298,968 inhabitants in 2006.104 Its highest point is 2.3 meters 
above sea level, and it is considered the lowest laying country 
in the world. Male, the capital city, holds 35% of the country’s 
population and is one of the most densely populated cities on 
earth. The city is surrounded by a 3.5 meters high sea wall,105 
credited with saving the capital from the 2004 Tsunami.106  
As indicated in the map, a sea level rise of one meter would inundate 
infrastructure and threaten living areas. This would pose a threat 
to the tourism industry that comprises the most important income 
source for the Maldives, but this is not the only risk. Maldives’ 
government has identified a number of vulnerabilities: land loss 
and beach erosion, infrastructure and settlement damage, damage 
smaller to larger islands has become an important prerequisite for 
development and for our survival.”108
To find adaptation alternatives for the approximately forty 
countries whose existence is threatened by rising sea levels, 
international cooperation and assistance is needed. One 
researcher at the recent climate negotiations in Poznan, Poland 
(COP 14) noted, “So few of the migrants we encountered in our 
fieldwork worldwide were able to migrate internationally—the 
vast majority face a situation where they ‘only make it’ to the 
next livable place. This will increasingly require countries to work 
together, especially developing countries”.109
to coral reefs, agriculture and food security, water resources, and 
lack of capacity to adapt (both financial and technical).107 The 
newly elected president of the Maldives, Mohamed Anni Nasheed, 
made international headlines in 2008 when he announced the 
“Safer Islands Plan” which includes internal resettlement from 
smaller, less populated islands to larger islands with better natural 
protection and enhanced coastal defenses. The plan even addressed 
the possible relocation of all the Maldives population to another 
country such as India or Iceland. 
Permanent Representative of the Maldives to the United Nations, 
H.E. Ahmed Khaleel noted, “Migration and resettlement from 
developing states, sea level rise could submerge entire parts of 
sovereign nations. The process of resettlement may in the long 
run be a central adaptation measure. Yet if entire sovereign states 
are submerged by rising seas, resettlement poses significant 
geopolitical questions and highlights the need for effective 
international cooperation.
Since 2004, CARE has been working with villagers in southern Bangladesh to help them adapt to increasingly intense and frequent 
flooding.  Activities include the creation of “floating gardens” that rest on a bed of water hyacinth (eichornia crassipes).  Buoyed 
by the hyacinth, crops can rise above the flood waters to protect a critical source of food and income. 
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Climate change is happening with greater speed and intensity 
than initially predicted.110,111 Safe levels of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases may be far lower than previously thought, 
and we may be closer to an irreversible tipping point than had 
been anticipated.112  Meanwhile, global CO2 emissions are rising 
at steeper and steeper rates.113  Emissions reductions efforts 
have been too little, too late. Therefore, the challenges and 
complex politics of adaptation are joining those of mitigation 
at the centre of policy debates.  One of the most important 
issues to address is how climate change will affect human 
migration and displacement—and what we will do about it.
There are many messages to be taken from the empirical evidence 
and maps presented in this Report.  The following are especially 
important:
Environmental change, displacement and migration
The reasons why people migrate are complex but frequently reflect 
a combination of environmental, economic, social, and/or political 
factors.  The influence of environmental change on human mobility 
is discernible and growing. Current and projected estimates vary 
widely, with figures ranging from 25 to 50 million by the year 2010 
to almost 700 million by 2050.  The International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) takes the middle road with an estimate of 200 
million environmentally induced migrants by 2050.
Livelihoods and human mobility
Environmental change is most likely to trigger long-term migration 
when it undermines the viability of ecosystem-dependent livelihoods 
(such as rainfed agriculture, herding and fishing) and there are 
limited local alternatives.  The degradation of soil, water and forest 
resources, as well as the direct impacts of climate change (e.g. 
shifting rainfall), are playing important roles in emergent patterns 
of human mobility.
Differential vulnerability
People’s vulnerability to environmental change reflects a 
combination of their exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. 
As a result, degree of vulnerability varies widely within countries, 
communities and even households. For instance, poor people’s 
exposure to the impacts of climate change is often higher than 
others because economic and political forces confine them to 
living in high-risk landscapes (e.g. steep hillsides prone to 
slippage).  Meanwhile, one of the most important factors shaping 
adaptive capacity is people’s access to and control over natural, 
human, social, physical, political and financial resources.  Their 
striking lack of these things is a major reason why poor people 
—especially those in marginalised social groups—are much 
more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change than others.  
Women contend with an especially wide array of constraints 
on their adaptive capacity. Gendered roles, as well as cultural 
prescriptions and prohibitions, make it far more difficult for most 
women and female-headed households to migrate in response 
to environmental change. 
Government action and risks
Some forms of environmental change, including sea-level rise 
and glacier melt, may require large-scale government action. 
However, interventions can leave people no better off, or 
even worse, than before.  As described in section 3.3 of this 
report, for instance, the government of Vietnam is currently 
relocating some people living in areas threatened by riverbank 
erosion, flooding and storm surges. Though the intention is 
commendable, resettlement can carry high costs including 
cultural degradation, lost livelihoods, reduced access to social 
services, and the loss of employment networks.  In sum, top-
down responses to environmental change carry substantial risk, 
including the risk of “mal-adaptation.”
The importance of inclusive, transparent and accountable 
adaptation processes 
The scale of current and projected environmental changes 
necessitates a crucial role for central governments.  Yet we have 
learnt from experience that benefits can be maximised and risks 
minimised if vulnerable populations are meaningfully involved 
in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
coordinated responses to environmental change.
This points towards one of the most important conclusions 
to draw from this report. Namely, that the scope and scale of 
challenges we face may be unprecedented; but we meet them 
already having many of the resources—including knowledge, 
skills and relationships—needed to protect the dignity and 
basic rights of persons threatened by displacement from 
environmental change.
4. Conclusions
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Technical Annex: Data and Methods
Fieldwork 
The extent of human-induced environmental degradation has been 
documented in a wide range of publications. The most commonly 
discussed environmental change resulting from human activities is 
climate change, but there are many other signs of environmental 
change, including soil fertility depletion, deforestation, and 
desertification. At the same time, humans face massive social, 
political, and economic changes today as a result of globalization 
and technological change.
Although there is substantial information about environmental 
change, natural hazards, migration, and economic development, 
systematic empirically- based knowledge about the links between 
environmental change processes and migration remains scarce. 
To help fill this gap, the European Commission funded the 
Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project 
(EACH-FOR) to explore the role environmental changes play 
in shaping migration decisions. This was done through the 
systematic overview and analysis of relevant natural and human-
made environment degradation processes, as well as the socio-
economic and demographic contexts in the regions studied in 
the project. The project undertook fieldwork in twenty-three sites 
around the world.
Mapping 
The maps in this report represent the integration, at scales 
ranging from continental to small islands, of geospatial datasets 
such as population (size, density, and distribution), hydrology 
(Asian river basins, highly populated river deltas), projected 
sea level rise (1 and 2 meters), agriculture (rain-fed agricultural 
land and areas in pasture), projected changes in runoff, and 
cyclones. These databases were compiled from different sources 
and integrated using GIS techniques. Calculations of populations 
at risk were made using zonal statistics. More information about 
data sources and methodologies used can be found below.
This superimposing of populated areas and current and projected 
environmental hazards seeks to provide an initial identification of 
populations and livelihoods potentially at risk of climate change 
impacts. This first “layer” of vulnerability114 could be considered 
part of the context that shapes migration decisions to a greater 
or lesser extent.
Data sets 
A list of data sets utilized in map production is found below. 
One issue that needs to be addressed wherever climate change 
projections are employed is which models and scenarios to use, 
and what specific variable (e.g. temperature or precipitation) is of 
greatest interest. While recognizing that changing temperatures 
will have wide-ranging ramifications for many tropical and sub-
tropical regions, especially where temperatures may exceed 
tolerances for specific crops, we felt that precipitation change 
is likely to have greater impacts on livelihoods. 
Once that decision was made, additional choices presented 
themselves. In the maps presenting drying trends, we chose 
to use data on projected changes in runoff by Nohara et al 
(2006) published in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), 
Working Group 2 Synthesis report. These data were produced 
using an ensemble of climate models, and correspond broadly 
to the pattern of changing precipitation minus evaporation 
found in other ensemble modeling approaches.115 Ensembles 
are generally more reliable than single model runs, since they 
average out the extremes. Runoff change was chosen rather 
than change in precipitation alone, or precipitation minus 
evaporation (P-E), because runoff represents the water that is 
effectively available for a range of human purposes, including 
crop growth and irrigation, and also for aquatic ecosystems, 
which are important for freshwater fisheries. However, as 
stated, whether one uses runoff or P-E, the patterns are 
broadly similar: (1) wet areas are getting wetter; (2) dry areas 
are getting drier; and (3) subtropical dry zones are expanding 
poleward. 
 
In terms of sea level rise, the IPCC AR4 projected potential 
eustatic (meaning produced by the melting glaciers rather 
than thermal expansion) sea level rise of 0.8–1m this century. 
However, recent research suggests that the upper bound for sea 
level rise may be closer to 2m.116 For this reason, we provide 1m 
and 2m bands for each delta area represented in section 4.3.
The following provides details on the data sets used for the maps 
in this report and, where appropriate, the methods for making 
map calculations:
Map 1:  Glacier melt and major irrigated agricultural systems 
in Asia
This map combines glacier data from Armstrong et al. (2009) with 
river networks from ESRI (2008) and irrigated areas from FAO 
(2007) and FAO & IIASA (2006). Watershed boundaries (drainage 
basins) are from USGS HydroSHEDS 2007 (Lehner et al. 2006). 
Urban extents, representing circa 1995 urban areas, are from 
CIESIN (2009a).
Areas under irrigation and population totals for the different 
drainage basins dependent on glacier runoff were derived by 
compiling zonal statistics based on a grid of each drainage basin 
using Spatial Analyst in ArcMap 9.3.
Map 2:  Mexico and Central America: Migration as a Coping 
Strategy for Drought and Disaster 
This map combines runoff change data from Nohara et al (2006) 
that were used in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report. The 
population density map is from CIESIN (2009b). The runoff 
data are from Fekete et al (2000). The suitability of rain-fed 
agricultural land is from FAO (2007). Cyclone hazard frequency is 
from CHRR et al (2005). 
Map 3:  West Africa: Pressure on Agricultural Livelihoods 
and Creeping Onward Migration
This map combines runoff change data from Nohara et al (2006) 
that were used in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report. The grid 
representing runoff change was “grown” using standard raster-
based methods (each new grid was assigned the maximum value 
of adjacent grid cells) so that it extended to or beyond the 
coastline, for better visualization. The population density map 
is from CIESIN (2009b). The runoff data are from Fekete et al 
(2000). The suitability of rain-fed agricultural land is from FAO 
(2007). The data on the proportion of area in pasture land are 
from Ramankutty et al (2008). The pasture map represents areas 
where the proportion of pasture is 70 percent or higher.
Maps 4, 5 and 6: Flooding and Sea Level Rise in Densely 
Populated Deltas: Ganges, Mekong, and Nile
These maps combine the following data sets. Geographic 
representation of the delta areas (delta masks) are from 
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Kettner (2009). The population density map represents year 
2000 population and is from CIESIN (2009b). Urban extents 
are from CIESIN (2009a). Data on sea level rise was developed 
from CGIAR’s Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) 90 meter 
data set (Jarvis et al. 2008). The data on the proportion of area 
under crop land are from Ramankutty et al. (2008). Cyclone 
hazard frequency is from CHRR et al (2005).
For the Ganges map, we provide a map of flood extent for the 2007 
flood from UNOSAT (courtesy of Einar Bjorgo and Luca Dell’Oro). 
For the Mekong map we provide an inset of flood extent for the 
year 2000 from the Dartmouth Flood Observatory (2006). 
In order to produce estimates of the year 2000 population that 
would be affected by a 1 and 2 meter sea level rise, we created 
a delta grid from Kettner (2009), then we took the year 2000 
population grid from CIESIN (2009c) and, using ArcMap 9.3’s 
zonal statistics, we calculated zonal statistics for the population 
that fell within the mask for 1– and 2 meter sea level rise based 
on CGIAR’s SRTM data (Jarvis et al. 2008). 
Maps  7-8: Sea Level Rise and Small Island Developing 
Countries
Data on sea level rise was developed from CGIAR’s Shuttle Radar 
Topography Mission 90 meter data set (Jarvis et al. 2008), and 
converted to KML. The images of the islands representing the 
capitals of the Maldives (Male) and of Tuvalu (Funafuti) were 
downloaded from Google Earth.  
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